

6 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: List of Outstanding JMWAVE Problem Areas

1. Boat Operations. What is the infiltration-exfiltration authority of JMWAVE? While we have all agreed for a number of months that authority to run infiltration-exfiltration boat operations should be given JMWAVE and, in fact, there has been some such authority extended by cable and confirmed in dispatches, but each time a specific operation arises, the same old reservations come up in our minds here in Headquarters. As a specific example, UN 40406 of 4 October, Operation CARIBBEAN, states that the KHRP is running an infiltration operation, that there is "no KUBARK interest," and that JMWAVE "only provided them with food and fuel." This is an excellent example of double talk. In fact, it is virtually impossible at the present time for any of the known groups in the Miami area to run an operation of this nature into Cuba without utilizing some personnel who could point a finger at KUBARK and/or the U.S. Government with regard to one or more of the following: contact and/or debriefing by CIA, training, support in repair or maintenance of boats, knowledge of KUBARK installations, special visa consideration, Coast Guard and L&M forbearance or non-observance of covert type activities and the like. Knowing this, it is incumbent upon the Division or the Branch to acknowledge with an "approved" or "disapproved" message in response to UN 40406.

2. It will be recalled that several weeks ago former Ambassador to London ROJAS proposed a sabotage operation of a peculiarly and flagrantly unethical nature. We had some reservations about this, first of all, because of LOB's holdings in the Dominican Republic and a lot of other places, and at the Branch level, we did not know if the Agency wanted to become a partner with LOB. We did not believe that SOLER SA would "buy" the proposal without some expression of U.S. Government approval. Thirdly, we doubted whether all the mechanics of pulling the operation could be effected without some direct Government support. Finally, we felt the U.S. would be, in any event, accused before the UN of being sponsor, or at least tolerating the operation, and we were not sure what the U.S. government "posture" would be in such an event. After various consultations at various levels in the Agency, ROJAS was told we would not finance the operation. He has now come back and stated that Silberburg and Malone will finance the operation and has implied, at least, that the Canadians will permit him to buy the planes and other equipment. All they want now is the go-ahead from KUBARK. We in the Branch do not see that the situation has changed very much, but would like to bring this matter to the attention of higher authority for review. In short, when is "plausible denial" more than "self delusion" in this type of thing?

3. AILCO Gordon and his lawyers. In 1961, advice that the Florida faction of the lawyers and judges refused to accept assistance from AILCO, as we thought they properly should. It will be recalled that per CUI 47956 AILCO was informed on 10 September that responsibility for organization and plans for exile Cuban artists and lawyers will be AILCO's. This cable was cleared, according to Col. King, by Mr. Goodwin and AHA of State, as noted on the cable itself by Col. King. Question: Do we now wish to support the Florida lawyers in any way or just let them drift and possibly become a nucleus of opposition to AILCO, and another exile faction of significance over whom we will (then) exert virtually no influence?

4. CONTE Aguerre and Mr. Howard Hunt's memorandum of conversation with Mr. Hornetick. CUI 97376, mentioned above, stated that our turning the lawyers over to AILCO did not constitute a precedent and AILCO's demand for responsibility as exclusive channel to Cuban exile groups, DIA and Ford, specifically rejected. AILCO agreed (then) that attempts to force these groups into the CRC would likely in the long run prove counter productive, although hopefully we would endeavor to give political guidance to the leaders of these entities. Since then we have had an exchange of cables with Miami in which it was indicated by Miami that AILCO in fact went back to CONTE Aguerre and insisted that CONTE's future activities be subject to the direction of the CRC. It is recalled to AAVI that CONTE's long maintained position of non-alignment with any political group was an asset for his activities and his job would not depend on his joining the CRC. Now we have a memorandum of 4 October from Mr. Hunt which in effect says we must reach an understanding with CONTE whereby independent support cannot be used to impede CONTE's joining the CRC. This of course does not mean that CONTE's broadcasts need be terminated, simply that they be financed and conducted through the existing CRC mechanism. Obviously this is in direct contradiction to our previous understanding with AHA and the White House. Aside from the need for Hunt to keep in closer touch with the Bureau, what is the answer?

5. CRC and internal Cuban groups. We have now been informed that as a result of our urging, the principal internal political groups have agreed to send representatives to the CRC, however, before final agreement:

if this is given to MIRO, probably in the next day or two, they would then not reading from us as to whether we sincerely want to do this and why by it. They say, and MIRO admitted to HUBA that representatives on 15 September, that they had told him so, that the CAC was of no importance on the inside. They also say they see no real use in having the CAC unless it helps the U. S. Government in some way.

It will be recalled that Col. Johnson has been sent to Miami under no cover for TOY to meet with MIRO. MIRO on the other hand, having demonstrated his strength vis-a-vis Washington in getting Col. Johnson assigned to Miami now leaves Col. Johnson sitting in Miami while he, at the scheduled time for the meeting, comes to Washington to raise questions, such as: did FBI know of Col. Johnson's appointment before MIRO knew? Obviously MIRO is following the advice still of YAFONA and is playing politics against the Agency. Questions: Is it now worthwhile trying to establish a public relations cover for Col. Johnson or should we simply have him represent himself as an intermediary of the U. S. Government? This "class" indicates clearly the lack of any real agreement in the White House and State Department or for that matter in the Agency as to exactly how we wish to conduct relations with the CAC, even as a procedural matter, much less with regard to major substantive issues. Any guidance on this would be extremely helpful.

R. E. WHITFIELD  
Acting Chief, WH/4

ROP/WH/4/RE:Whitfield:mas (6 October 1961)

Distribution:

- Orig. - ADC/WH/4
- 1 - C/WH/4
- 1 - C/WH/4/Plans
- 1 - AC/WH/4/PA-Prop
- 1 - AC/WH/4/PM
- 1 - AC/WH/4/PI-CI